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Bundling has been regarded as a highly ambiguous method for price discrimination or 
vertical control.  Barry Nalebuff has recently proposed an alternative model of bundling as a 
highly suspect exclusionary tactic.  A virtue of the model is that its exclusionary implications do 
not appeal to strategic considerations, e.g., threatening to charge a predatory price for the bundle 
now and recoup losses later. It involves two goods, A and B, each initially supplied by 
monopolies.  If the A-monopolist sells an A-B bundle at the sum of those monopoly prices, the 
B-monopolist loses half of its profits and consumer welfare falls.  Because those prices are not 
an equilibrium, we focus on three possibilities: sequential pricing, simultaneous pricing—both of 
which involve the B-monopolist remaining—and monopoly, i.e., where the bundler is the only 
seller of A or B.   
 
In all cases, including B’s departure followed by a monopoly price, total welfare and 
consumer welfare are greater after bundling than before.  We cannot guarantee that bundling 
always increases welfare, but the results have intuitive support.  By bundling, the A-monopolist 
provides previously non-existent competition with the B-monopolist in the latter’s market.  The 
B-monopolist’s exclusion comes from the lost profits due to the A-monopolist’s entry.  Bundling 
is an entry barrier because competition reduces profits.  Were bundling harmful, the per se 
proscription against market allocation should be lifted.  It would presumably be beneficial for an 
erstwhile bundler and a single product firm to cut a deal in which the former stops bundling in 
order to preserve a monopoly for the latter.  Our findings suggest, however, that the present 
antitrust rules promote welfare and, thus, that generic opposition to bundling remains 
unwarranted.            1
Is Competition the Entry Barrier? 
Consumer and Total Welfare Benefits of Bundling 
 




The economics of bundling has a long and complex history, characterized mainly by a set 
of results that focus on price discrimination.
1  As with the price discrimination literature 
generally, bundling has been regarded as a practice with highly ambiguous consequences.   
Analyses of bundling by monopolists are either indeterminate or depend heavily on virtually 
unobservable variables such as correlations of inframarginal valuations across the bundled 
products.
2   
A recent article by Barry Nalebuff
3 offers a possible breakthrough in this conceptual 
logjam, by placing bundling in a context where it has effects on the viability of a separate single-
product monopolist.  Numerous features of the model are notable and commendable.  He sets out 
a compelling model of how a decision by a monopolist in one market to bundle its product with a 
second can drive down the profits of the second product’s supplier.  It offers a clear conclusion 
regarding the competitive effects of a practice long regarded as a means for benign price 
discrimination or efficient vertical control.  An important secondary benefit of the model is that it 
derives its exclusionary implications without appealing to strategic considerations, e.g., 
threatening to charge a low price for the bundle in order to drive the other firm out of the market 
and then subsequently charge a high price for the bundle.  In his view, this model provides ample 
evidence that bundling by one firm can deter entry or drive out firms that continue to sell single 
                                                 
1 Stigler, George, “A Note on Block Booking,” in G. Stigler, The Organization of Industry (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1968): 165-170. 
2 Adams, Walter and Janet Yellen, “Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 90 (1976): 475-98; Schmalensee, Richard, “Commodity Bundling by Single Profit Monopolies,” Journal 
of Law and Economics 25 (1982): 67-71; McAfee, R. Preston, John McMillan and Michael Whinston, 
“Multiproduct monopoly, commodity bundling, and correlation of values,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 
(1989): 371-83. 
3 Nalebuff, Barry, “Bundling as an Entry Barrier,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (2004): 159-87    2
products.  Bundling, in this model, may also be profitable even if the entrant remains in the 
market.
4  
The analysis of this model, however, is somewhat incomplete.  The effects that provide 
the clearest intuitive appeal for the notion that bundling might drive out firms from the market 
are not as closely tied to equilibrium results as they might be.
5  A more important omission is the 
calculation of consumer and total welfare in the various equilibria that might ensue.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, it turns out that in all of the equilibria that might be relevant—price leadership by 
the bundler, Bertrand pricing, and monopoly pricing following exclusion—consumer welfare and 
total welfare are higher than in the pre-bundling equilibrium.     
These findings, particularly the last, could change with different specifications, but such 
as they are they suggest that the model presented by Nalebuff cannot support a generic suspicion 
of bundling.  Incorporating fixed costs incurred by the bundler (and fixed costs saved by the 
exiting single product firm) could change the outcomes, but the recommendations following the 
bundling model do not take those effects (in either direction) into account.
6  These results lead 
one to look for reasons why bundling may be competitive, even if the result of that competition 
is, as in markets in general, the exclusion of firms that cannot remain competitive.  We end by 
suggesting that using the Nalebuff model as a policy guide would reverse long standing per se 
antitrust rules against market allocation. 
 
2. Model and reference calculations 
 
Producers and consumers 
At the core of Nalebuff’s analysis is a clear and clever model of consumers uniformly 
distributed on the unit square, where the ordered pair describing a consumer’s position reflects 
his willingness to pay for two goods, A and B, each of which are produced at zero marginal cost 
by sellers we refer to as the A firm and B firm respectively.
7  He looks at three different settings, 
                                                 
4 As such, this is a useful counter to the prevailing doctrine in monopolization law that a sacrifice of profits is a 
necessary condition for anticompetitive conduct.  For a precursor, see Salop, Steven and David Scheffman, “Raising 
Rivals’ Costs,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 73 (1983): 267-71. 
5 This may be more important in some of the ways the model has been presented rather than in the paper itself. 
6 Our objective is not to offer a fully-specified bundling model, but to show that the leading model provides 
insufficient bases for recommendations that antitrust policy against bundling be stricter. 
7 We use A and B to designate the names of the firms initially selling goods A and B.  A will be the bundler, so 
sometimes “firm” A will sell “product” B.  I hope this is not confusing.   3
in which (i) A and B are sold separately, (ii) the A firm bundles A and B and the B firm leaves 
the market, and (iii) the A firm bundles A and B are bundled and firm B remains, selling B only.  
The following figures below display these three scenarios: 
A, B unbundled  only AB bundle sold
8  AB bundle, B sold 
 
In these diagrams, VA and VB are respectively the values consumers place on A and B, 
distributed equally from 0 to 1; the bundle is valued at VA + VB.
9  The maximum total surplus is 
1, net of any fixed costs associated with the production of A, B, or a bundle. 
Without bundling, consumers buy a good if its price is less than the value they place on 
it, i.e., Vi > Pi for i = A, B.  With bundling and no independent sales of B, consumers buy if VA + 
VB > PAB, the price of the AB bundle.  If B is sold independently, these conditions determine 
whether a consumer would buy B or the bundle.  Those who might choose either will choose the 
bundle (just B) if the surplus from buying the bundle is greater (less) than the surplus from 
buying just B. 
 V A + VB – PAB >(<) VB – PB, implying when 
 V A >(<) PAB – PB.   
 
No bundling 
We begin with the first diagram.  Prior to bundling, the A and B firms each set prices for 
their individually sold goods at .5 and sell .5 units, i.e., to half of the customers in the universe.  
Each firm obtains profits of .25; profits together are .5.  The fraction .25 of consumers who value 
both goods at less than .5 buy nothing and obtain no surplus.  The surplus for those from the .5 
                                                 
8 The monopoly price of the bundle is less than 1, so we need not consider cases where PAB > 1.  See n. 8 infra. 
9 Nalebuff includes discussion of cases with more than two products, correlation (positive and negative) between VA 
and VB in the two good case, and complementarity and substitutability between A and B.  Those merely present 
variations on the points illustrated by the case here and at the core of Nalebuff’s article. 
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who buy just one and not the other is an average of .25, giving .125 for them.  The average 
willingness to pay of those who buy both A and B is 1.5, implying a consumer surplus of .5 on 
average for the .25 who buy both of these, or .125.  Hence, consumer surplus is .125 + .125 = 
.25, and total surplus is this .25 plus the .5 profits, or .75.   
 
Bundling by A, B exits 
Two settings are relevant after bundling: the A firm has the market to itself after 
bundling, and the A firm sells its bundle in competition with B sales from the B firm.  Consider 
the first.  We can restrict our attention to a bundle price PAB < 1, as profits are greater there than 
with PAB > 1.
10  At a price PAB and no stand-alone B sales, the quantity purchased is given by the 
area above the diagonal in the second diagram.  That area, QAB, is thus 
 Q AB = 1 – PAB
2/2. 
Bundling profits ΠAB to the A firm are 
  ΠAB = PABQAB = PAB[1 – PAB
2/2] 
The bundle price PAB* that maximizes profits is the solution to 
  1 – 3PAB
2/2 = 0,   
which gives, as Nalebuff reports, 
 P AB* =  3 / 2  ≈ .816. 
and profits ΠAB ≈ .544. 
With no stand-alone B provider in the market, consumer surplus is the valuation given by 
the consumer to the bundle, less the price, VA + VB – PAB.  From the second diagram, the 
consumer surplus to bundle purchasers, CSAB, is 




































The contribution to surplus for consumers with valuations VA < PAB will be, on average 
[1 + VA – PAB]/2, from a density of 1 + VA – PAB consumers, leading to a contribution of [1 + VA 
                                                 
10 If PAB > 1, then the only customers purchasing the product will be those in the triangle above the line VA + VB = 
PAB.  The number of those customers, given by the area of that triangle, will be [2 – PAB]
2/2.  Profits ΠAB = PAB[2 – 
PAB]
2/2; and d ΠAB/dPAB = 2 – 4PAB + 3PAB
2/2.  It is straightforward to show that in the range 1 < PAB < 2, d 
ΠAB/dPAB < 0.   Consequently, the firm’s profit maximum will be where PAB < 1.   5
– PAB]
2/2.  For consumers with valuations VA > PAB, the average surplus will be [1/2 + VA] – PAB 
from a density of 1 consumers.  Hence, consumer surplus CSAB will be 












∫ ∫ − + + − + ,    (1)   
which when solved yields 



























At PAB ≈ .816, the monopoly price, consumer surplus CSAB ≈ .274, and total surplus is 
thus about .819.  We will discuss further the observation that both consumer surplus and total 
welfare are higher in this post-bundling monopoly case (.274, .819) than in the equilibrium 
without bundling (.250, .750). 
 
Bundling by the A firm; the B firm remains 
More complex situations arise if the B firm remains in the market even after the A firm 
offers the AB bundle.  The quantity of B sold stand-alone if the B firm remains in the market, 
QB, is the area of rectangle in the lower right corner of the third diagram above. 
 Q B = [PAB – PB][1 – PB] 
The B firm’s profits ΠB are thus 
  ΠB = PB[PAB – PB][1 – PB]. (2) 
Because ΠB is a cubic function of PB with a positive coefficient on PB
3, the B firm’s profit 
maximizing PB, holding PAB constant, will be the smaller of the two roots of 
 3PB
2 – [2 + 2PAB]PB + PAB = 0,  
given by 
 P B =  
3
P P 1 P 1
2
AB AB AB + − − +
. (3) 
If PAB = 1, B’s best response would be to set PB = 1/3. 
With the B firm remaining in the market, we will have surplus CSB for the stand-alone B 
buyers, given by   6





















The average valuation place on B among the buyers is [1+PB]/2 for each unit sold, 
implying that CSB is 
 CSB =  [] [ ] B B AB
B P 1 P P
2
P - 1
− − . (4) 
The A firm’s sales of the bundle, QAB, are given by the area above the lines where VA + 
VB = PAB and VB = PB.  This area is  






-   1 B . 
Consumer surplus CSAB from sales of the bundle to these customers is the truncated 
integral in (1), where the first integral is calculated from PAB – PB, not 0.   
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From the substitutions in the previous section, we can recalculate this as: 













∫ ∫ − + + − + . 
This comes out to be 


























B , (5) 
with the only difference from the earlier calculation being the replacement of the first PAB 
by PB.  Profits ΠAB to the A firm from selling the bundle will be 






-   1 B . (6) 
Calculating the value PAB that maximizes ΠAB depends upon the pricing model.  As with 
Nalebuff but in reverse order, we identify two scenarios.  One is Bertrand pricing, where the 
bundling A firm takes the stand-alone price of B, PB, as given.  In that scenario, the profit 
maximizing PAB given PB is given by the solution to   7






-   1 B  = 0,  
yielding 










1 B B . (7) 
We can find the Bertrand equilibrium by simultaneously solving (7) and (3) for PAB and 
PB.  Using iterative numerical methods, we find that PAB ≈ .607 and PB ≈ .245.
11  At that point, 
the A firm’s and B firm’s profits can be calculated from (6) and (2) as ΠAB ≈ .369 and ΠB ≈ .067, 
with aggregate profits approximately equal to .436.  From (5) and (4) consumer surplus from the 
buyers of the AB bundle and the stand-alone product B are respectively CSAB ≈ .368, and CSB ≈ 
.103.  Aggregate consumer surplus is approximately .471, and total welfare rounds up to about 
.908.  Relative to the no-bundling case, the Bertrand equilibrium has lower aggregate profit, but 
greater consumer and total surplus. 
The main pricing model Nalebuff examines is one in which the bundling firm A sets 
price first and the stand-alone B seller, firm B follows.  Analytically, this would involve 
maximizing profits ΠAB as defined in (6) with PB endogenously determined by the bundler as 
defined by (3).  Using numerical methods, we find (again with Nalebuff) that the profit 
maximizing price PAB set by the bundler if it is a price leader is approximately .681.  Since prices 
are strategic complements, the bundler now internalizes some of the negative (to it) externality 
from cutting price when B follows, so PAB in the price leadership model will exceed the Bertrand 
price.   
With a greater PAB, PB will be greater as well, calculated from (3) approximately .265.  
As above, we can use (5), (2), (6), and (4) to calculate profits and consumer surplus, finding ΠAB 
≈ .374, ΠB ≈ .081, CSAB ≈ .311, and CSB ≈ .112.
12  Aggregate profits are about .455, aggregate 
consumer surplus is .423, and total welfare is .878.  Market performance is not as good as under 
                                                 
11 Nalebuff reports Bertrand equilibrium prices for the bundle and the stand-alone product as .59 and .24 
respectively.  The difference arises because of an error in his derivation of the bundle price (what he calls “x”), n. 3 
supra at 180.  The last term on that page in the first expression under “Profits are maximized at” should be pb
2/2, not 
pb
2, using his notation. 
12 It may seem odd that consumer surplus for the B buyers is greater under price leadership than under Bertrand 
model, where the stand-alone price of B is lower (.245 under Bertrand compared with .265 under price leadership).  
However, under price leadership A’s price is greater as well, so there are more customers purchasing B under price 
leadership, .305 compared to .274 under Bertrand.  The per-customer surplus under Bertrand is greater, about .378 
compared with about .367 in the price leadership equilibrium.   8
the Bertrand equilibrium, but this price leadership model implies that bundling reduces aggregate 




To assist in the assessment of the bundling policy implications, we combine these results 
and others we will mention into the following table, which we can then analyze case-by-case.  
The A firm’s price is for the bundle and the B firm’s is for its stand-alone product, unless 
indicated. 












1) A, B sold by separate monopolists  .5 (just A)  .5  .250  .250  .250  .750 
2) A firm sells bundle at 1, B firm stays at 
.5 
1 .5  .375  .125  .208  .708 
3) A firm sells bundle at 1, B firm 
optimizes 
1 .333  .278  .148  .265  .691 
4) A firm sets bundle price before B, 
knowing B firm stays 
.681 .265  .374  .081  .423  .878 
5) A firm sets bundle price where it does 
at least as well if B firm exits than if it 
stays 
.408 n/a  .374    0  .603  .977 
6) At the bundle price in (5), B firm stays  .408  .179  .374  .034  .623  .965 
7) B firm leaves at maximum price 
leadership price in (4) 
.681 n/a  .523  0  .372  .895 
8) A firm bundles A and B, B firm stays, 
price set simultaneously (Bertrand) 
.607 .245  .369  .067  .471  .908 
9) A firm maximizes A-B bundle profit as 
monopolist, with no B seller 
.816 n/a  .544  0  .275  .819 
10) A firm sells A and B unbundled, B firm 
sells B, Bertrand competition 
.5 (just A)  0  .25  0  .625  .875 
11) Both firms sell A-B bundle  0 (both)  0 (both)  0  0  1  1 
 
Rows 1-3: Initial moves from the no-bundling equilibrium 
The first row is the initial no-bundling separate monopoly equilibrium. PA and PB are .5, 
aggregate profits are .5, consumer surplus is .25, and aggregate welfare is .75.  Row 2 contains 
the case that conveys the exclusionary intuition of the model, where the A firm bundles A and B   9
and sells the bundle for PAB = 1 as the sum of the separate prices, while the B firm continues to 
sell at PB = .5.  The B firm’s profits fall by half, providing the exclusionary effect.  Aggregate 
profits remain the same as under the no-bundling equilibrium, but consumer surplus and 
aggregate welfare fall by .042.   
From the consumer perspective, bundling is weakly Pareto-inferior. Everyone who was 
getting A and B before pays 1 with or without the bundling.  Every consumer who valued A by 
more than .5 and B less than .5 loses.  Those in this group who value the bundle at less than 1 do 
not buy when they did before and forego some surplus.  Those who do buy the bundle at 1 pay .5 
more but get less than .5 more value from the addition of B.   
At this point, bundling appears worth prohibiting.  However, unless the B firm is locked 
into selling its product at .5, it would want to change its price to respond to the A firm’s offering 
of the bundle at PAB = 1.  Row 3 shows the B firm’s optimal response, where it cuts PB from 1/2 
to 1/3.  With that price cut, A’s profits fall by .97, almost 26%, from .375 to .278.  The B firm’s 
profits slightly increase from .125 to .148.  Consumer surplus increases also, from .208 to .265.   
Consumer surplus is already above what it was in the no-bundling equilibrium, yet 
aggregate surplus falls relative to the no-bundling equilibrium.  The net loss in profits to the B 
firm (.250 to .148, or .102) outweighs the .28 gain in profits to the A firm from bundling and the 
.15 gain in consumer surplus.  A consumer surplus standard would support bundling in this case, 
but including producer profits, particularly losses to the bundler, would argue against bundling.  
We might also note here that even if consumers as a whole gain, some do lose.  Those who have 
a relatively strong preference for A but value B by less than .5 will find that the increase in price 
of getting A (from PA = .5 to PAB = 1) outweighs the value of the B they now get as part of the 
bundle.  
 
Rows 4-7: Bundling by the A firm as price leader 
As Nalebuff notes, this last result is not an equilibrium.  It does not allow the A firm to 
optimize in setting PAB, either taking PB as given (Bertrand-Nash) or realizing that the B firm 
will set PB following the A firm’s choice of PAB (price leadership).  Row 4 displays the above 
results of the calculations the main equilibrium he discusses, in which the A firm sets PAB first 
and PB follows.  If the B firm remains in the market, the A firm’s optimal response is to cut the 
price of the bundle.  We found above that the A firm cuts the bundle price PAB down to .681,   10
with the stand-alone price falling to .265.  Relative to Row 3, the A firm’s profits are almost 50% 
greater than in the no-bundling equilibrium.  The B firm’s profits, however, are much lower, 
.081, losing 2/3 of its profit in the no-bundling equilibrium.  Total profits fall relative to no 
bundling slightly, from .5 to .455.   
With B’s stand-alone price PB only a little more than half of what it was in the no-
bundling equilibrium, and the bundle price PAB only .681 rather than 1, consumer surplus rises 
from .250 without bundling to .423, nearly a 70% increase.
13  The increase in consumer welfare 
exceeds the slight reduction in aggregate profit, leading to an increase in total welfare from .75 
with no bundling to .878 with bundling, about a 17% increase.  By either a consumer or total 
welfare standard, if the B firm remains in the market and follows the bundle price, bundling 
should be favored.             
The B firm, however, need not remain in the market, if profits following observation of 
PAB would be less than the costs of remaining.  Two cases are immediately worthy of note, 
displayed in Rows 5 and 7.  Row 5 reproduces a case Nalebuff identifies, looking at the smallest 
price the A firm would set for the A-B bundle knowing that the B firm would then leave.  That 
price would be that lowest for which the A firm’s profits, given the B firm’s departure, equal the 
profit the A firm would have received if the B firm would have remained.  Those profits, from 
Row 4, equal .374.  As set out in Row 5, if the A firm were to set the bundle price PAB = .408 
and the B firm were to leave, the A firm would also obtain profits of .374.  At any lower price, 
the A firm would make lower profits than it would if it chose the price-leadership equilibrium.  
Row 6 displays the B firm’s profits, maximized at that bundle price by setting PB at .179, as .034.   
If profits of that magnitude are insufficient to keep the B firm in the market, it would 
leave.  From Row 5, even with the B firm’s departure, the bundle price is so low—lower than the 
stand-alone price of either A or B without bundling—that consumer welfare increases over 140% 
(from .25 to .603).  Aggregate welfare is .977, 30% above the no-bundling level and nearly the 
theoretical maximum of 1.  Intentional price-cutting to drive out the B firm appears to be an 
economic boon.  Note also that, in this model, comparing Rows 5 and 6 suggests that holding 
PAB constant, if the B firm remains in the market, consumer surplus rises but total welfare falls.  
The cost to the bundler, the A firm, of the B firm staying in the market, again holding price   11
constant, exceed the profits to the stand-alone firm and the gain in consumer surplus from having 
the stand-alone alternative.  
If the B firm leaves because .034 in profit is insufficient, presumably that entails a saving 
of whatever fixed costs it would have had to incur, exceeding .034, to remain.  If so, on the other 
hand, the A firm presumably had to incur costs to provide B.  Unless the A firm’s costs of 
bundling B with A exceed the B firm’s costs of continuing to produce B, bundling with 
exclusion substantially increases welfare.  This serves as a reminder that the net benefits of 
bundling if the B firm stays would need to take into account the A firm’s costs of bundling.
14  A 
would be willing to expend up to the gain in profits above the no-bundling level of .25 in order to 
do so.  Looking at Row 4, however, if even all of A’s profit gain relative to no bundling was 
wiped out by the cost to A of offering the bundle, total surplus be .754 (.878 – .124), still higher 
than the total welfare in the no-bundling equilibrium.   
In addition, even if the A firm has to cut price all the way down to .408 to drive out the B 
firm, it still makes higher profits with the bundle (.308) than before it bundled (.250).  This 
comparison holds for every scenario.  Even if one were to believe that bundling were bad, the 
decision to bundle, at any predicted post-bundle price, can pass the profit sacrifice screen 
supposedly required for monopolization under present law,
15 and will do so net of any 
unspecified fixed costs.  In general, scenarios that cause the B firm to leave, by definition, 
increase the A firm’s profits, implying that exclusionary conduct in this setting will not involve a 
profit sacrifice.  
The bundler need not have to cut the PAB down to .408 to drive the B firm out of the 
market.  From an aggregate welfare perspective, the worst case price-leadership scenario would 
be that the A firm would only have to set PAB only just below .681.  (This assumes the A firm’s 
mere announcement of a bundle would not drive the B firm out; we come to that below in the 
Bertrand case.)  Row 7 displays the case where the B firm leaves after the A firm sets the bundle 
price PAB at .681.  The B firm will exit if profits of .081 (from Row 4) are insufficient to cover its 
costs.  Net of fixed costs, this still produces greater consumer surplus and total welfare (.372, 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 Again, not all bundle buyers are better off.  Those who value A by at least .5 but do not value B by as much as 
.181 will either not buy a bundle when they bought A before, garnering some surplus, or will buy the bundle but lose 
surplus.   
14 A fully specified model including fixed costs would have to include a reason why the A firm and not the B firm is 
the bundler.  Presumably this suggests that the A firm’s costs of offering the bundle are not great, less than those of 
the B firm offering A.   12
.895) than with no bundling (.250, .750).  Again, comparing Rows 4 and 7 suggests that holding 
the bundle price constant, the B firm’s departure reduces consumer surplus but raises total 
surplus.  
 
Row 8: Bundling by the A firm followed by Bertrand competition; the B firm remains 
Perhaps a more likely scenario than price leadership is simultaneous pricing of the A-B 
bundle and B as a stand-alone product.  Row 8 reproduces the calculations for the Bertrand 
equilibrium.  Both PAB and PB are below their respective levels in the price leadership 
equilibrium.  With simultaneous pricing, the A firm has no price response from the B firm to 
factor into its decisions and discourage price cutting.  With lower prices, aggregate profits (.436) 
are below those in the price leadership equilibrium in Row 4 (.455).   
Consumer and total surplus are greater under Bertrand (.471, .908) than under price 
leadership (.423, .878) as set out in Row 4.  The most important reference point is the no-
bundling case in Row 1.  Compared to no bundling, the Bertrand equilibrium shows that 
bundling increases consumer surplus by 82% (from .250 to .455) and total welfare by 21% (from 
.750 to .908). 
 
Row 9: Announced bundling by the A firm induces the B firm’s exit 
With simultaneous pricing, the A firm’s announcement of the bundle itself to lead the B 
firm to exit prior to any prices being set, if the B firm’s Bertrand profit of .067 (from Row 8) is 
insufficient to cover fixed costs of remaining in the market.
16  If such an announcement leads to 
the B firm’s departure, we are left with the monopoly (no stand-alone B) equilibrium calculated 
above, where the A firm sets PAB = .816.  The A firm’s profit more than doubles from the no-
bundling case; gaining more (.294) than the B firm loses (.250) when the no-bundling 
equilibrium no longer holds.   
However, under monopoly, consumer surplus also increases by about 10%, from .250 to 
.274.  Hence, total welfare increases as well, from .750 to .816—even if bundling leads to 
exclusion and post-exclusion monopoly pricing.  This result is likely not to be an artifact of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 Verizon v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
16 This may be a price game analogue to the quantity commitment effect of bundling in Whinston, Michael, “Tying, 
Foreclosure, and Exclusion,” American Economic Review 80 (1990): 837-59.  I owe this observation to Ken Corts.   13
particular structure of the model and not general.  Nevertheless, one cannot conclude the 
bundling that leads to exclusion and monopoly hurts consumers or the market as a whole.     
 
Rows 10-11: Direct competition in stand-alone B or the bundle 
Following Nalebuff, we should not restrict our attention to cases where the A firm offers 
the two goods A and B only as a bundle.  Row 10 sets out the case where the A firm enters the B 
market but sells the products separately.  PA will be the stand-alone monopoly price of .5, and PB 
will fall to marginal cost, which is 0.  Consumer surplus becomes .625, the highest so far in the 
sample.  This might suggest a rule requiring that if A enters the B market, it must do so on an 
unbundled basis.  However, because these gains are predicated upon the B firm remaining in the 
market and selling at a price of 0, total welfare of .875 is below the welfare if the B firm remains 
under either price leadership (Row 4) or Bertrand (Row 8) equilibria, .878 and .908 respectively.  
Under a total welfare standard, unbundling even under the most optimistic scenario need not be 
beneficial. 
A last case is worth mentioning—the B firm bundles as well.  Row 11 sets out that 
scenario.  With zero marginal production costs, the price of both bundles offered by the A and B 
firms will fall to zero.  All consumers will get A and B, so that both consumer surplus and total 
welfare equal the theoretical maximum of 1.  That both would bundle is not foreordained in this 
model, but neither should policy toward bundling be determined by assuming that only one firm 
is capable of bundling.  A rule that bans bundling as exclusionary conduct would preclude firms 
from competing by each offering bundles, potentially generating considerable consumer benefits.     
 
4. Summary: Should market allocation be per se legal? 
 
This model has served as the basis for rekindling antitrust skepticism toward bundling.
17  
Yet, the immediate inference from its results, when consumer and total welfare are explicitly 
calculated is that bundling is a good thing.  In every plausible equilibrium—monopoly, Bertrand, 
and price leadership—consumer welfare and total welfare are greater than in the no bundling 
case.  These gains do not represent Pareto improvements.  The provider of the stand-alone 
                                                 
17 For a recent example, see Edlin, Aaron and Daniel Rubinfeld, “Exclusion or Efficient Pricing?  The ‘Big Deal’ 
Bundling of Academic Journals,” Antitrust Law Journal 72 (2004): 119-157.   14
product loses, as do some consumers who place a relatively high value on A and little value on 
B, and are thus forced to take a bundle that they don’t want.  However, regardless of one’s 
position on the question of whether consumer or total welfare should be the antitrust standard, 
bundling would appear to be beneficial. 
The one exception appears to be where the A firm enters the B market, and sells it on an 
unbundled bases, leading PB to fall to zero.  Even in that case, because the B firm will not keep 
selling at PB = 0 unless it has no fixed costs, then it would have remained in the market with 
bundling under either price leadership or Bertrand pricing.  In both of those bundling scenarios, 
total surplus is greater than if A were forced to sell B on a stand-alone basis (although consumer 
surplus is greater with forced unbundling).  Were the A firm forced to unbundle, its profits from 
offering B would be no greater than not.  If it bears any costs of offering B, it will not do so, and 
one will be left with the no-bundling equilibrium, with lower consumer and total surplus than 
any of the bundling alternatives.  Moreover, if B can bundle A’s product, the equilibrium price of 
both bundles would fall to zero, maximizing attainable consumer surplus.  So, even on its own 
terms, the model suggests, if anything, that we should force A to bundle.  
Many of these welfare results favoring bundling, particularly that between the bundler-as-
monopoly (Row 9) and the no bundling equilibrium (Row 1), may be artifacts of this specific 
model.  Changes in the density of the distribution of consumer preferences, and substitution or 
complementarity among the products, may well switch the outcomes.  We also neglect the 
possibility of supply-side economies of scope or other production complementarities.  We cannot 
guarantee that bundling always increases welfare, despite its doing so in this particular model.  
As noted above, bundling does reduce the welfare of the non-bundling firm and some parties 
forced to pay more to get something they do not much want.   
A more important aspect is that all of the analysis neglects fixed costs neglected, both the 
A firm’s cost of adding B and the B firm’s saved fixed costs if it exits.  If the B firm exits, that is, 
if the A firm’s bundling succeeds in being exclusionary, neglecting fixed costs may be more 
appropriate.  Absent fixed cost asymmetries, the B firm’s avoided fixed costs of remaining in the 
market would equal the A firm’s costs of adding the second product to the bundle.   
Bundling may be more problematic, consequently, if it is not exclusionary, and the A 
firm bears significant costs of entry.  However, the net gains remain positive under all scenarios 
where the A firm profits net of fixed costs and the B firm remains.  The only scenario where   15
fixed costs matter is if the A firm’s costs of bundling are substantially greater than the B firm’s 
costs of staying in the market, yet the A firm’s entry drives the B firm out and would lead to the 
monopoly bundle pricing in Row 9.   
These findings indicate that while bundling may be an entry barrier or, more precisely, an 
exit facilitator, it will increase consumer and total welfare.  Despite the use of this model to 
encourage stricter antitrust proscriptions against bundling, it provides more support for allowing 
it.  However, perhaps the focus of this model is not overall welfare but on driving the single 
product seller out of the market.  In all cases, bundling substantially reduces the stand-alone 
seller’s profits.  If the role of antitrust is to protect the profits of incumbent firms, perhaps this is 
all that is necessary for this model to guide policy, although it comes close to contradicting the 
aphorism that antitrust should be able protecting competition, not competitors.   
We should ask why nominally exclusionary conduct—bundling—can increase total 
welfare and consumer welfare.  Bundling drives the stand-alone single product firm out of the 
market not because a price is in any way predatory (especially under a profit sacrifice test).  
Rather, it is because one firm’s decision to bundle creates competition against the second that it 
did not previously face.  By bundling, the bundler provides previously non-existent competition 
with the B firm in its formerly monopoly market.  The scenario in which the A firm offers B on 
an unbundled basis shows this most clearly—the B firm’s price and profits are driven to zero.  
To condemn bundling for being exclusionary is to condemn competition for being exclusionary.   
Were the anti-bundling argument valid, it would provide a rationale for allowing a 
bundler and a single product firm to cut a deal in which the former stops bundling in order to 
create a monopoly for the latter.  For example, suppose we start out with the A firm offering a 
bundle against the B firm selling B alone with Bertrand competition.  Suppose further that the A 
and B firms were to enter into a market allocation agreement, with the A firm selling only 
product A.  Comparing rows 1 and 8 in the table, industry profits would rise (from .369 + .067 = 
.436 to .25 + .25 = .5), so the firms would find such a deal profitable.  Yet, consumer and total 
surplus would fall (respectively from .471 to .250 and from .908 to .750).   
The B firm need not have remained in the market for a market allocation agreement to be 
profitable.  If the A firm has to cut its bundle price below .618 to get the B firm to leave in the 
price-leadership game, a price below the equilibrium of .681but above the Bertrand equilibrium, 
A’s profits will be below .5.  Hence, the A and B firm’s joint profits would be greater under a   16
no-bundle equilibrium.  But if A sets a price at .618 and B leaves, consumer welfare would be 
.421 and total welfare .921, both considerably above what they would be following an agreement 
to go to the no-bundling equilibrium.  
These results are consistent with standard antitrust practice.  Under present antitrust law, 
such a deal would be per se illegal market allocation.  If bundling is an anticompetitive entry 
barrier, the per se proscription against market allocation should be lifted.  Such a policy 
recommendation, based on the exclusionary intuition, would be ironic and astonishing.  A more 
careful examination of the consumer and welfare effects shows that the case against bundling, 
and these corollary implications, is exaggerated if not unwarranted.  It would reflect a 
fundamental change in antitrust policy, that to provide only hypothetical improvements to future 
competition—dynamic benefits not modeled in Nalebuff’s article—present welfare-increasing 
pro-competitive activities should be suppressed.      
 